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MinorityRepresentationunder Cumulative
and Limited Voting

David Brockington
University of Washington

Todd Donovan
Western Washington University

Shaun Bowler
University of California, Riverside

Robert Brischetto
University of Texas, San Antonio
We examine minorityrepresentationresultingfrom modified at-largeelections (cumulativeand limited voting) used in U.S. localities in the 1990s. Hypotheses about the relative proportionalityof
descriptiverepresentationundervarious local election systems are presentedand tested. We find that
CV/LV elections produceddescriptiverepresentationof African-Americansat levels similar to those
in larger single-memberdistrict places, and at levels that exceed those from some small, southern
SMD places. Results for Latino representationare more qualified. Our results offer encouragement
for those interestedin facilitating minority representationwithout using the acrimoniousprocess of
drawingdistrictson the basis of races.

ecent decisions of the United States SupremeCourthave directedincreased
attentionat alternativesto districtingfor the purpose of minority representation
(see Pildes and Donoghue 1995). In this paper we assess how modified at-large
plans (limited and cumulative voting) might facilitate minority representation.
We also examine how representationunderthese plans comparesto that obtained
with districtand at-largeelections.
In previous decades, court interpretationsof the Voting Rights Act (VRA)
broadenedthe ability of the U.S. Departmentof Justice and minorityplaintiffsto
challenge local election plans that might dilute minority vote strength (i.e.,
Thornburgv. Gingles 1986; Gomez v. Watsonville1988). The plans most often
An earlierversion of this paper was presentedat the 1995 annualmeeting of the AmericanPolitical Science Association. Partial funding for the research was provided by the WWU Bureau for
FacultyResearchand by UC Riverside. Direct correspondenceand requestsfor data used in this paper to Todd Donovan, Department of Political Science, WWU, Bellingham, WA 98225 (or
donovan@nessie.cc.wwu.edu).
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol. 60, No. 4, November 1998, Pp. 1108-25
? 1998 by the University of Texas Press, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, TX 78713-7819
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subject to challenge include councils elected under multimember,at-large systems. The standardremedyin these situationshas been changingto single-member
district (SMD) plans, with districts drawn to facilitate minority representation.
Indeed, a substantialbody of evidence demonstratesthat racial and ethnic minoritiesare more likely to win seats proportionateto their shareof the population
in districtedjurisdictions(Engstromand McDonald 1981; Polinard,Wrinkle,and
Longoria 1991; Welch 1990).
Limits to Districting as a Remedy
Districting on the basis of race, however,has come under increased scrutiny
by the courts.The Shaw v. Reno decision (1993) criticized "bizarre"-shapeddistricts. Miller v. Johnson (1995) found a majority-minoritycongressional district
unconstitutionaland arguedthat districtsshould not be drawnbased "on race in
substantialdisregardof customaryand traditionaldistrictingpractices."Shaw v.
Hunt (1996) and Bush v. Vera(1996) found separatedistrictingplans in violation
of the FourteenthAmendment'sequal protection clause. When race is found to
be the "predominantfactor" in districting,the contemporaryCourt must apply
the strict scrutiny test for the equal protection clause. This makes it extremely
difficult for state and local governments to establish a compelling interest in
adoptingsuch districts.
Majority-minoritydistricts have also come under criticism since they may
"waste" votes (Lijphart 1994; Still 1984). Others suggest that districting can
limit minorityinfluence over policy (Guinier 1991, 1994; Sass and Mehay 1996)
and prevent the formationof coalitions across racial lines (Swain 1993). There
are practical problems as well. Edward Still (1991) notes that districts drawn
with a 65% African-Americanpopulation are perhaps the bare minimum requiredto facilitateAfrican-Americanrepresentationin some instances, although
Brace et al. (1988) note that this minimumvaries greatly by place.
Cumulative and Limited Voting in the United States
In response to the perceived limits of districting,cumulativevoting (CV) and
limited voting (LV) have been proposed as a means of increasingminority representation. A number of small- and medium-sized U.S. jurisdictions have
adopted these plans (Amy 1993; Cole and Taebel 1992; Cole, Taebel, and
Engstrom 1990; Still 1984, 1991).l Both systems operate to elect multimember
councils at-large and facilitate proportionalityby changing how voters cast
ballots.
Severaljurisdictionsin North Carolina,Alabama,and Texas adoptedmodified
at-large systems (and to a lesser extent, places in New Mexico, South Dakota,
I There is only one jurisdictionin the United States with a populationover 100,000 using a CV or
LV system: Peoria,Illinois.
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and Illinois). Over 75 city councils, county councils, and school boards had
adopted CV or LV at the time of this writing.2These elections create relatively
low thresholdsof exclusion the proportionof votes that a group needs to elect
one candidate assuming all the group's voters support the candidate. In a CV
election for a five-membercouncil, for example, a minority candidatewith 17%
supportcould not be denied a seat.3
Under LV,voters are restrictedto fewer votes than seats up for election. Candidates are elected by plurality,and candidates with the most votes win until
seats are filled. In party systems, outcomes under LV are expected to be more
proportionatethe more limited the vote is relativeto the numberof seats at stake
(for a descriptionsee Lakeman 1970, 80-88; Still 1984, 253-55).4 Cumulative
voting modifies at-largeplans by allowing voters to cast as many votes as seats
being elected, with the additionaloption of clustering votes among any combination of candidates.The voter may typically distributevotes in any way she
feels, including distributingthem across fewer candidatesthan available seats.
Candidatesare elected by plurality,and candidateswith the most votes win until seats are filled.
Variationin CV and LV plans in the United States is characterizedby manipulation of two main factors:the rules regardingvote allocations, and the number
of seats elected via CV or LV Election rules determine the number of seats
elected under CV or LV directly by reducing or enlarging the number of positions in a given jurisdiction, or indirectly through staggering the elections of
those positions across time. Most applicationsof CV allow voters to distribute
their votes as they choose, but at least one (Peoria, IL) constrainshow votes are
cast by providingonly one space next to each candidate(then dividing five votes
across the candidatesmarked).
Table 1 illustratessome importantpoints about variationacross modified atlarge election plans in U.S. places having 1,000 or more population. Clearly,
there is no single CV or LV plan. Most places using CV elect their entire council at-large with CV-although a small number of places mix CV with
single-member districts (an example being Alamagordo, NM). Across all CV
places, the averagenumberof seats elected is only slightly lower than the average numberof total seats (6.29 vs. 6.41). Table 1 shows that these elections tend
to occur in places having significantminoritypopulations.
2

Details abouteach jurisdiction'ssystems were identifiedwith phone calls to local officials in each
place. Communicationswith local officials and individualsinvolved with VRA litigation led to the
identificationof these communities. Several additionalplaces are in the process of settling lawsuits
that will result in the adoptionof limited or cumulativevoting.
3The thresholdof exclusion for CV is equal to 1/ (1 + [numberof seats]).
4Lijphart(1994, 40) points out an extreme (hypothetical)case where three seats are contestedand
voters cast one vote. One candidatecould win all but two votes while the second and thirdcandidates
receive one vote each. All would be elected if there is no legally defined minimum for election. The
thresholdof exclusion for LV is V(V + n) where V # votes and n # of seats (Engstrom1993,
Still 1984).
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TABLE1

Cumulative and Limited Voting Arrangements in U.S. Communities
CumulativeVoting(CV).
Averagenumberof total council seats per place
Averagenumberelected at-largewith CV per place
Averagenumberelected CV per election
Averagenumberminorityseats per placea
Averagepercent minorityvoting age populationa
Number of cases (elections)

6.41
6.29
3.22
0.57
31
79

Limited Voting(LV):
Averagenumberof total council seats per place
Averagenumberelected at-largewith LV per place
Averagenumberelected LV per election
Averagenumberminority seats per placea
Modal vote limit:
Averagepercent minorityvoting age population'
Number of cases (elections)

7.06
4.94
4.00
1.06
1
0
17

Note. Cases used for averages are based on individualelections.
aFiguresfor the largest minoritygroup only.

Table 1 also demonstratesthatmany CV places do not elect all seats in a single
election. In places outside of Texas, the entire board or council (typically five to
seven members) is typically elected in a single election with CV Yet in Texas,
although the entire council is often elected by CV, elections are staggered over
time such thatonly two or threeseats areup in a single contest.This causes the average numberof seats elected via CV per place, per election cycle (3.22) to be
substantiallyless thanthe averagenumberof seats elected via CV perplace (6.29).
In about one-third of places using LV, some seats are elected from singlememberdistrictswith the remainingelected from multimemberdistrictsat-large.
Conversely,about two-thirdsof the places using LV elect all council seats from
at-large,multimemberdistricts. Few of these places elect all seats in the same
election (most stagger elections). For this reason, many places limit voters to a
single vote, typically cast in an election with three or four seats up (avg. = 4.00).
LV plans include furthervariation.At least one county utilizes place requirements (a candidatemust reside in a specific multimemberdistrictelected via LV)
and uses more than one multimemberdistrict.A small number of places allow
voters to cast two to four votes, dependingon how many seats are elected.
Strategic Burdens under Limited and Cumulative Voting
There are reasons to expect some deviations from proportionatedescriptive
representationin CV and LV places. CV and LV are often labeled as "semiproportionate"in classifications of electoral systems (Amy 1993; Lakeman
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1970). Much of the potential for these modified at-large plans to produce
deviations from proportionalitylie in the demands for strategic coordination
(Cox 1997) that each system places at the mass and elite level. Under each system, a party or slating group must effectively maximize seats by controllingthe
candidate selection process such that they place an optimal number of candidates on the ballot. To optimize representation,the groups must also spread
their supporters'votes accurately across those candidates they nominate (Still
1984, 254-55). Skill at this has been cited as an explanation for the seat
bonuses5 received by Japan's LDP under a form of limited voting (Cox and
Niou 1994). If a group overnominatesand lists too many candidates, it risks
spreading the votes of supporterstoo thin, causing underrepresentation.If a
group undernominates,it errs by possibly wasting votes that might have yielded
anotherseat.
These strategic burdens can apply to both larger parties/groupsand smaller
parties/groups(Goldburg 1994; Silva 1964). However,Lijphart(1994) and others suggest that LV systems might be legitimately considered as PR since the
strategicburdensare often likely to be greaterfor majoritiesthan minorities.A
minority group often need only nominate one candidateto insure some representation (or simply nominate as many candidates as votes allowed). Majority
groups, in contrast,can have a greaterrisk of nominationerrors(Lijphart1994,
42; Taageperaand Shugart 1989; see also Cox 1991). Christensenand Johnson
(1995) find Japan'sSNTV system to be proportionatewhen comparedto other
PR systems if districtmagnitude(seats per district)is accountedfor.
Controlof nominationsunderCV might also be requiredfor proportionatedescriptive representationof minority groups, but CV further modifies at-large
plans in a manner that can produce an additional strategic burden for groups.
With CV,groups must coordinatetheir supporters'voting behaviorto discourage
voters from spreadingtheir multiple votes in a manner that disperses electoral
strength.In other words, voters must be informed about the optimal strategyof
clustering votes among candidates. Plainly, CV can require strategic coordination at both the mass (vote distribution)and elite (nomination)levels, while LV
might require less coordinationif the vote is limited to one. As a result, Still
(1984, 256) suggests that CV is likely to requiremore strategicvoting than LV
to achieve proportionalresults (on the possibility of strategic mistakes by minority voters in CV, see also Engstrom 1993).
Since CV allows voters more options when delivering their votes, the existence of such opportunitiesincreases the probabilitythat some minority voters
will spreadvotes across multiple candidates,even if only one minoritycandidate
is running.This, in turn, increases the chance that minority votes might go to
nonminority candidates, potentially limiting the translation of minority vote
The seat bonus is the proportionof seats a group receives in excess of its share of the vote.
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strengthinto seats.6Furthermore,in CV or LV places where a group'spopulation
shareis near the thresholdof exclusion and voting is raciallypolarized,minority
candidates can only be elected if their supportersturn out at a rate matching
majority-groupvoters. All of this suggests that descriptive representationof
minorities under CV might be somewhat less proportionateto population than
that obtainedunder LV.
There are reasons to expect that each plan could produce less proportionate
descriptiverepresentationthan SMD systems. With SMD plans, if cartographers
have the ability to tailor boundariesto create heavily minority districts,and they
create a numberof minoritydistrictsin proportionto overallminorityvote share
in a jurisdiction,then proportionatedescriptiverepresentationcan be expected.
Comparedto CV/LV,once homogeneous majority-minoritydistricts are created,
limited strategic behavior is required of elites (e.g., mobilization of minority
voters in numbersapproachingmajority-groupturnoutand controlling nominations), and little strategic electoral behavior is required of voters (e.g., vote
dispersion)to produceproportionatedescriptiverepresentation.7In other words,
districtingcan institutionalizesome of the strategic actions needed to facilitate
minorityrepresentation,and could possibly producegreaterminorityrepresentation than CV/LV systems.
Hypotheses: Outcomes Under Modified At-Large Voting
The discussion above suggests several testable propositions about how the
seats-population relationship in modified at-large elections compares to those
obtained under districting,to unmodified at-large (AL) plans, and how LV and
CV results compareto each other.
First, we expect that modified at-large systems should produce more proportionate representation of minorities than that resulting from the traditional
at-largemethod.Assuming that a group votes roughlyas a block, any group winning a plurality is likely to sweep all seats in an unmodified at-large election
(Lakeman1970). Although nearly every electoral system has bias in favor of the
group gaining the largest vote share in an election, the bias is greatest under
American-styleat-large,plurality systems (Johnson 1979). Conversely,both LV
and CV have lower minimum thresholdsthan at-large elections. Cox (1991) illustratesthat outcomes under forms of limited voting in party systems can even
be equivalentto d'Hondt PR under certain obtainableconditions.
6Surveys from a city using CV illustratedthat 36% of Latinovoters used the option to cast at least
one of their votes for a non-Latino candidate (Cole, Taebel, and Engstrom 1990; Cole and Taebel
1992).
7Optimal districtingarrangementsare a possibility where minority groups are highly segregated
spatially. Since African-Americanhousing is historically more segregated from whites than Latino
housing (Massey and Denton 1987), districtingmight produce more-proportionaterepresentationof
African-Americansthan of Latinos (Taebel 1978; see also Vedlitz and Johnson 1982).

This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 17:13:40 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1114 David Brockington,ToddDonovan, Shaun Bowler, and RobertBrischetto
Second, given strategic demands and the "semiproportionate"nature of
CV/LV,we expect that modified at-large local elections might produce lessproportionate descriptive representation of minorities than SMD elections.8
Modified at-large plans can facilitate minority representationby lowering the
threshold of votes required for a minority candidate to win office, but groups
must be fairly well organized politically to take advantage of these systems.
SMD plans might facilitate minority representationwith less coordinationrequirementsfor elites and voters.
Third, limited voting might be expected to produce more-proportionateoutcomes than cumulativevoting. This hypothesis is based on the assumptionthat
the lattersystem can requirean additionalelement of strategicbehavior(coordination of vote dispersion)from voters and elites.
Data and Framework for Analysis
Cases for ourtests are drawnfromU.S. cities, counties, and school districtsthat
adoptedCV or LVin responseto actualor anticipatedVRA lawsuits. Since we are
interestedin estimatinghow electoral systems are relatedto representationof minority groups relative to their share of the local population, we limited our
analysis to jurisdictionsfor which 1990 census populationdata are available.Initial informationon local election systems and election resultswere obtainedin the
spring of 1995 via telephone interviewswith city clerks and county election officials, with additionaldata acquiredin subsequentinterviews in 1996 and 1997.
Nearly all the places we identifiedare located in three states:Texas,Alabama,and
North Carolina.South Dakota,New Mexico, and Illinois each also have a single
jurisdiction that used CV We limit our analysis to places from these six states
where the predominantminoritymade up less than 50% of the voting population.
We treat individualelections as cases. This allows us greatercomparabilityin
our analysis, largely because this diffuses the problemcreatedby those jurisdictions that stagger.elections.We include the two most recent elections from each
jurisdictionin the analysis, or the most recent if the jurisdictionhad only one CV
or LV contest as of spring 1997. This allows us to capturevariationin elections
across places and within places, since most of these communities alternatethe
number of seats contested in consecutive elections. Data from nearly all these
places involve elections contested between 1994 and 1997, althoughthe second
most recent elections in three places were held between 1990 and 1992.
The dependent variable is the percentage CV or LV seats won by minority
candidatesin each election. Our models thus isolate the seats-population rela8This logic does not suggest that any (national) electoral system using winner-take-all,singlemember districts would ever produce more proportionateoutcomes than a multimemberLV/SNTV
or CV system. It is importantto note that the difference in proportionalitywe expect is not so much
a functionof single-memberdistrictsper se, but of the apportionmentof racial and ethnic groupsinto
particulardistricts.

This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 17:13:40 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Minority Representationunder Cumulativeand LimitedVoting

1115

tionship unique to modified at-large elections, and eliminate from the analysis
those seats elected in these communities by other methods.9 Communities
included in the seats-populationanalysis were limited to places with a population of more than 1,000, the minimum for racial informationto be included in
census data. Most communities are rathersmall, with a median population of
3,167 and a mean of 10,311. The resulting sample used to assess the seatspopulation relationship includes a total of 62 jurisdictions offering data for
96 elections.
Table 2 demonstratesthat minorities have had success contesting these elections, despite low levels of representationpriorto the change in election systems.
A Latino candidatewas elected in 70% of the contests where a Latino candidate
sought office under CV Further,in 96% of CV/LV elections where an AfricanAmericansought office, at least one African-Americanwas elected. Table2 also
illustrates something that will be discussed below: in elections where the predominantminoritywas Latino, Latino candidateswere on the ballot in only 71%
of elections.
Hypotheses about how elections translate minority voting age population
share into minority seats on local councils can be tested by regressing seats
against population (Engstrom and McDonald 1981). Bivariate regression produces slope estimates that can be used to assess differences in seats-population
relationshipsacross electoral systems, and can be comparedto those produced
by other studies using the same method. For example, when percentagedata are
used, a slope of 1.0 with an interceptof 0 indicates that minority seat shares on
TABLE2

Racial/Ethnic Distributionof Cases
Predominant
Minority
Group

Elections with
Minority
Victory

Total
Number of
Elections

Elections with
Minority
Candidates

Latino

66

47 (71%)a

33 (50%)'

African-American

28

26 (93%)'

25 (89%)'

Native American

02

01 (50%)a

00

(70%)b

(96%)b

(0%)ab

Note: Cases are individualelections. Data are from the two most recent elections, or the most recent election if the jurisdictionhad only one CV/LV contest as of 1997.
apercent of all elections
bpercent of elections where minoritycandidatessought office
9For example, if a place was electing five seats via CV (or LV) in an election, the dependent
variablewould be calculatedas # CV seats won by minoritycandidates/S.Likewise, if a place elected
three seats via districts,and two via CV,the dependentvariablewould be # CV seats won by minority candidates/2.
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local councils occur in exact proportionto the percent of the local voting age
populationthat is minority.
Due to the nature of our data, our analysis is slightly different than some
studies of minorityrepresentation.Many studies now use regression models estimated with a universe of medium and large cities (i.e., all cities over 50,000).
With such data, a single model can be specified with multiple intercepts and
interaction terms that represent how different electoral systems affect the
seats-populationrelationship.Interactionterms allow single-equationmodels to
test if various electoral structureshave differenteffects on minority council representation (Bullock 1994; Bullock and MacManus 1993; Engstrom and
McDonald 1981, 347; Welch 1990, 1055).
Ourdatadifferfromthese "larger-N'studiesin thatourcases areelection results
fromsmallerplaces andoursampleis the universeof all knownplaces above 1,000
populationusing CV or LV.Given the small numberof cases, the unique characteristics of these communities,and the circumstancesunderwhich these election
systems are adopted,we cannotincludemultipleintercepttermsthatdirectlycomparethe seats-populationrelationshipunderLV and CV to othersystems.
Models are first estimated for all CV and LV jurisdictions, including cases
where the predominantminority group is either African-American,Latino, or
Native Americanl0(model 3.1). We then estimate separatemodels for AfricanAmerican and Latino places to assess if modified at-large voting is associated
with a different seats-population relationshipfor these groups (models 3.2 and
3.3, respectively).We also estimate a multivariatemodel with all cases using an
interactionterm and dummy variableto test if minority representationis more
common underLV than CV (models 3.4). To evaluate our other hypotheses, the
slopes resulting from these models are comparedto those produced from other
studies. This can provide some idea of how minorityrepresentationundermodified at-largeelections comparesto other electoral systems used in U.S. localities.
Informationaboutthe slope of these relationshipscan be more importantthan
a simple demonstrationthat more minorities serve on these local councils after
changing to modified at-large voting. Each of these jurisdictions adopted new
electoral systems because they had sizable minority populationswith very limited (or in many places no) minority representation.Only two of these places
have minority populationsunder 10% (the lowest being 7%).11In many (if not
10Ina single CV jurisdiction(Sisseton, SD school district)the predominantminoritygroup is Native American.
11Forexample, Thomas and Stewart(1988, 171) note that 44% of Alabama Black Belt counties
examined in a 1982 federal study (U.S. Civil Rights Commission 1983, cited in Thomas and Stewart
1988) had no black representation.Many of these counties having no black representationhad majority-blackpopulations.A numberof our towns are drawnfrom these counties. Each of the North
Carolinaplaces using LV were also in VRA targetedareas since 1964. Keech and Sistrom(1994) report that 90% of North Carolinacounties and cities were unmodifiedat-largeas of 1989. Blacks were
heavily underrepresentedin these places. In places where blacks were a minority,representationalequity scores did not exceed .20. Nearly all of our North Carolinacases come from these communities.
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most) of the jurisdictions included in our analysis, minority representationincreased under modified at-large voting. Our models illustrate the systematic
nature of this process in a manner that facilitates comparison with studies of
other electoral systems.
Results
Results from model 3.1 indicate that when all modified at-largejurisdictions
are examinedsimultaneously,there is a poor fit between minoritypopulationand
percent of seats controlledby the minoritygroups.Variationin seats-population
relationships across modified at-large places is evident when we examine
African-Americanand Latino jurisdictions separately.The fit of the model is
greatly improved(R2 = .26) when African-Americanjurisdictionsare examined
in isolation (RJ2increasesto .45 when the analysis is restrictedto cases with black
candidates).Model 3.2 illustratesthat for these places, the relationshipbetween
seats and minorityvoting age populationis representedby a slope of .95 and an
interceptnot significantlydifferentthan zero. Thus, in those elections where the
primaryminority is African-American,as the minority percentageof the population increases, a nearly equivalent gain in descriptive representation is
achieved.Furthermore,since the interceptis near zero, populationshare is translated into representationat low levels of minoritypopulation.
Model 3.3 reports the slope of the seats-population relationship for places
where the predominantminority is Latino. Given the insignificantslope and the

TABLE 3

MinoritySeats-Population Relationship under Cumulative
and Limited Voting
Model 3.1

Model 3.2

Model 3.3

Model 3.4

Variables

(All)

(Black)

(Latino)

(LV)

Minority%VAP

.15
(.18)

.95***
(.31)

.03
(.21)

.01
(.18)

LV Dummy

-

LV*Min%VAP

-

Intercept
R2
Number of cases

.15**
(.06)
.01
96

-

.04
(.08)
.26
28

.16
(.07)
.00
66

-.19
(.15)
1.12**

(.48)
.17**
(.06)
.12a

96

Note. Dependent variable = numberCV/LV council seats won by minorities divided by number
of CV/LV seats in election.
aR2for model 4 is adjusted;all others unadjusted.
**p < .05; ***p < .01 (two-tailedt-tests)
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very low R2,there does not appearto be a substantivelinearrelationshipbetween
minoritypopulationshareand minorityseat shareon councils and school boards.
This does not mean that Latinocandidateswere not elected in places that adopted
modifiedat-largevoting.As with majority-African-American
jurisdictions,Latino
candidateswere elected in greaternumbersafter switching to modified at-large.
As reportedin Table2, where Latinocandidatessought office, they were successful in over half (33 out of 47) of these cases markinga dramaticimprovement
over previous levels of Latino representationin these communities (Brischetto
1995; Brischetto and Engstrom 1998). Nevertheless, elections in many places
with substantialLatinopopulationsproducedno Latinorepresentationdue to both
a lack of candidatesor defeat at the polls. Even when the analysis is restrictedto
cases where Latino candidatessought office (not reportedhere), there is still no
significanteffect. In the discussion section we addresshow seats-populationmodels can underestimatethe potentialfor Latinorepresentation.
We hypothesized that these new modified at-large systems would produce
more-proportionatedescriptive representationof minorities than standardatlarge plans, and less-proportionaterepresentationthan SMD plans. Our results
are put into perspectiveby comparingthe parametersfrom our models to those
from other studies examining local election systems in the United States. If we
compare our slope and intercept for African-Americanrepresentationunder
modified at-largesystems to those from previous studies of standardat-largesystems, we find some supportfor these hypotheses.
As Figure 1 illustrates,the seats-populationrelationshipforAfrican-Americans
under recently modified at-largevoting is similarto that found by Welch (1990)
for African-Americansin larger (over 50,000 residents) southern cities using
SMD where blacks are a minority of the population.Figure 1 compares our results from model 3.2 to Welch's findings.Across much of the range in minority
population, it appearsmodified (CV/LV) plans (representedby the dotted line)
producesimilarlevels of representationas districting(the solid line), and slightly
greaterdescriptiverepresentationthan standardat-largeplans (the dashed line).
Since nearly all of our cases come from elections in relatively small places
that recently switched election systems, Welch'sdatamight not be best suited for
comparingseats-populationrelationshipsacross systems. When we compareour
estimates to those from a study of other southern places that had recently
switched away from AL plans a study that includes many smaller,ruralplaces
more similar to communities in this study levels of African-Americanrepresentation under modified at-large plans appear more striking. Bullock (1994)
examined elections to county commissions in Georgia in 1991. Of the counties
studied, 52 used SMD plans, an increase from 17 in 1981.12 Figure 2 plots
12Like the cases in our study then, many of these places had recently moved away from AL plans
in response to actual or potential VRA action under Section 2. As with our study, Bullock's cases
were limited to places where African-Americanswere in the minority(N = 149 counties). Given the
recent election system changes in many of these places, and the small populationand ruralnatureof
many,we suggest they are a good basis for making comparisonswith our study.
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FIGURE1
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FIGURE2

CV/LVSeats-Population Relationship Compared to Other Systems,
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Bullock's bivariate seats-registration relationship in SMD places (the solid
line) and the relationship we estimated in model 3.2 for African-American
jurisdictions using CV/LV plans (the dotted line). The plot demonstratesresults contrary to one of our hypotheses modified at-large elections actually
produced slightly more proportionateoutcomes when compared to these districtedplaces.
The differences between standardat-large elections and CV/LV elections are
substantialwhen we compare our estimates to those from Bullock's study of
Georgia counties, and are consistent with the hypothesis that CV/LV plans will
producemore-proportionaterepresentationof minoritiesthantraditionalAL systems. The dashed line representsthe bivariateseats-registrationrelationshipfor
the 41 Georgia counties still using unmodifiedAL elections in 1991. Compared
to these cases, modified at-largesystems producedsubstantiallygreaterdescriptive representationfor African-Americans.13
Our last hypothesis dealt with the differencebetween outcomes underLV versus CV systems. Since LV plans might involve fewer strategicburdens(e.g., vote
dispersion coordination),we expected that LV systems could produce greater
minority representationthan CV Model 3.4 included a coefficient reflecting the
interactionbetween a dummy representingLV places and minority voting age
population. In theory, this coefficient isolates the unique seats-population
relationship for LV.The significant coefficient for the interactionterm (1.12;
p < .05) can be seen as reflecting greaterproportionatedescriptiverepresentation of minorities when comparing LV to CV places. This is consistent with
assumptionsthat lower strategicdemandsare requiredfor effective use of LV.
It is importantto stress that there are relatively few cases of LV elections in
the analysis in Table3 (N = 17), and all are in places where the predominantminority is African-American.14 The interaction in model 3.4 could possibly
capturethe difference between African-Americanrepresentationunder LV and
Latino and African-Americanrepresentationunder CV
Another way to determine if minorities achieve higher representationunder
LV is to estimate the seats-population slope for the 28 places with AfricanAmerican minorities. We first estimate the seats-population slope unique to
these places using CV (model 4.1), then compare this to the slope for AfricanAmerican places using LV (model 4.2). These results are reported in Table 4.
Again, we find evidence suggesting a more-proportionate(or overproportionate)
relationshipbetween minority population and seats in LV elections (b = 1.12,
13 Differences between our estimates from CV/LV and Bullock's estimates from AL and SMD are
even more strikingwhen we consider that our models use percent minority voting age populationas
the key independent variable, while Bullock uses percent minority voter registration. Given the
gap between population and voter registration, our estimates could have been expected to be
biased against findingproportionaterelationships,which would be evident when registrationdataare
used.
14All of the variationin election plans occurredacross African-Americanplaces.
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TABLE 4

African-American Seats-Population
Relationship under Cumulative
and Limited Voting

Variables
Minority%VAP
Intercept
R2
Number of cases

Model 4.1

Model 4.2

(CV only)

(LV Only)

.60**
(.25)
.10**
(.04)
.38
I1

1.12*
(.61)
-.02
(.19)
.19
17

Note: Dependent variable = numberCV/LV council seats won by minorities divided by number
of CV/LV seats in election.
*p < .10; **p < .05 (two-tailedt-tests)

p
.08) than in CV elections (b = .60; p < .05).15 However, the population-seats coefficient under LV is not significantly larger than the coefficient
underCV The slope and interceptvalues for the population-seatsmodel in Table
4 does suggest that CV communities elect black candidatesat about the same
rate as the districtedplaces analyzed by Bullock as black populationsapproach
50%.At lower ranges of black population,the interceptfrom model 4.1 indicates
that CV produces greaterrepresentationthan Bullock's SMD places.
There are many additionalelements of election system variationthat cannot
be capturedby these dummy variables(degree to which vote is limited, proportion of all seats elected CV or LV,years thatjurisdictionhas been using CV or
LV,etc.). Given limited degrees of freedom here, we cannot include these terms
and thus cannot conclude with certaintythat LV as practicedin the United States
producesmore-proportionaterepresentationof minoritiesthan CV
Finally, we should note that there are reasons to expect that the number
of seats being contested should affect proportionalityfor any election system
(Lijphart1994). We did include this as an independentvariable in preliminary
models, but the effect was not significant. Since our goal is replicatingmodels
from other studies that did not include this measure, we do not include the
term in models reportedhere. There is limited variance in numberof seats contested among these elections, so it is difficult to evaluate the effect of this
variable.
15A t-test of the differencebetween these slopes produces no significantdifference.The power of
the test is constrainedby the small sample.When an interationterm (LV*minority%VAP)
is included
with all 28 cases from Table4, the coefficient is positive (b = .52) but not significant.

This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 17:13:40 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1122 David Brockington,ToddDonovan, Shaun Bowler, and RobertBrischetto
Discussion
Our dataprovide evidence that modifying local at-largeelections with limited
or cumulativevoting offers the promise of minorityrepresentationat levels very
similar to those found under SMD. This finding should be encouragingto those
interested in facilitating minority representationwithout relying upon the acrimonious process of drawingdistrictson the basis of race. Previous researchhas
establishedthat minoritiesdo win seats underthese modified plans. Ourpurpose
was to identify how the seats-populationrelationshipunder CV/LVcomparesto
those produced under other plans. For African-Americans,representationfrom
CV/LV elections compares favorablyto that obtained from SMD, and is more
proportionatethan representationunderunmodifiedat-large.For Latinos in communities studied here, this might not be the case.
Our results from Latino places raise questions about why CV election
outcomes are less than proportionate. In the cases examined here, underproportionalityreflected by our estimates is likely related to a function of three
main factors: (1) limited recruitmentof Latino candidates,(2) a substantialgap
between census measures of Latino voting age population(the key independent
variable in these models) and actual rates of Latino participationin elections,
and (3) the high threshold of exclusion built into CV plans adopted in many
places where Latinos are the predominantminority.
Among our cases are a numberof Texas CV elections (N = 33) having substantialLatinopopulationsbut achievingno Latinorepresentation.In 19 of these
cases, clerks indicated that no minority candidates filed for office. Likewise,
there were only two cases where African-Americanscomprisedthe predominant
minoritygroup and no African-Americancandidatesought office. Since the data
reveal that the nominationproblem is more substantialfor Latinojurisdictions,
undernominationcan partiallyexplain the lack of a linear relationshipbetween
seats and populationshare in majority-Latinojurisdictions.
There were also 14 cases where Latino candidates were defeated in places
with significant Latino populations.A second major factor affecting our ability
to estimate representationof Latinos in modified at-largesystems was the use of
census measuresof voting age population.In most of the Latinoplaces included
in this analysis, Latino turnoutwas far lower than white turnout.16 Percentminority VAP data is likely to produce a lower estimated slope than would result
had registrationor turnoutdata been used, since these latter variablesmore accuratelyreflect minority electoral strength.The gap between census measuresof
voting age population and actual turnoutrates is also likely to be smaller for
African-Americansthan for Latinos.When Latino turnoutdata were includedin
a model limited to the 14 Texas communitieswhere such data are availableand
in which Latino candidates sought office in 1995, the slope for the Latino
16In two of these jurisdictions, minority turnout actually exceeded Anglo turnout and minority
candidateswere elected. Turnoutdata are reportedin Brischettoand Engstrom 1998.
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seats-turnoutrelationshipis 1.22 (RI2= .30), and the result was statisticallysignificant.17 This demonstratesthat Latino candidatescan do well under CV when

Latino voters are mobilized.
Compoundingthe population-turnoutgap is a third factor. Most places in
Texas tended to have only two or three CV seats up in any single election. All
but two of the Latino cases in the analysis came from Texas.This means that the
threshold of exclusion is typically either 25% or 33% in Texas. Low minority
turnoutwill be particularlyproblematicwhen this thresholdis this high.
We should stress that none of these factors explaining lower rates of Latino
representationare an automaticresult of the use of modified at-large electoral
system. Rather,the constraintslie in how some CV plans were designed, and
how groups utilize the system. If no more than two seats are contestedvia CV in
an election, it will be difficult for any minorityto gain seats unless the minority
votes as a block, controls a relatively large share of voting age population(near
or greaterthan 33%), and mobilizes voters to turn out at rates matching or exceeding the majoritygroup'svoters.
If, however,the election plan creates a thresholdthat does not exceed the minority group'selectoral strength,and a minoritypolitical group is organizedsuch
that it can recruit candidates, perhaps have some control over nominations,
and/ormobilize voters to directall their votes to specific candidate(s),then many
of the strategic burdens associated with CV/LV can be overcome. Our results
suggest thatthese burdensare clearly surmountable,and that CV/LVplans do facilitate proportionatedescriptiverepresentationof minority groups under easily
obtainableconditions while avoiding the use of race-conscious districting.Our
results suggest that many of the potential strategicburdensand coordinationrequirementsassociated with CV are readily overcome by minority candidates.
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